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1.   Basic issues of historical semantics 
 
Theories of meaning change have to give answers at least to some of the following questions: 
(i) Under what conditions are semantic innovations possible? (ii) Are there characteristic 
types and regularities of meaning change? (iii) How do universal constraints and cultural tra-
ditions interact in meaning change? (iv) How do innovations become routinized and conven-
tionalized? (v) What are the paths and mechanisms of diffusion of semantic innovations? (vi) 
How does semantic innovation change the internal structure of a cluster of senses of a lexical 
item (the question of polysemy), (vii) How does semantic innovation change the semantic 
relationships between different expressions (the question of meaning relations and semantic 
fields), (viii) How are meaning changes related to changes in the history of mind, the history 
of society, the history of theories (changes of knowledge and changes of concepts) etc.? (ix) 
How do we interpret texts from earlier historical periods (the hermeneutical question)? (x) 
What counts as an explanation of a meaning change?  
One of the aims of this article is to show which of these questions have been tackled so far in 
different research traditions, in which ways and with what amount of success. The kinds of 
detailed questions that can be asked concerning meaning change and the types of possible 
answers to these questions are determined to a large extent by the theories of meaning presup-
posed in formulating these questions. Therefore my discussion of important traditions of re-
search in historical semantics will be linked to and partly organized in relation to the theories 
of meaning embraced by scholars in the respective research traditions.  
The relationship between historical semantics and theoretical semantics is not a one-sided 
affair. Not only did semantics as a scientific study first arise in the context of 19
th century 
historical linguistics, but also in 20
th century semantics and especially since the 1980s many 
foundational issues of semantics have been discussed in connection with problems of meaning 
change, e.g. the problem of polysemy. What Blank and Koch wrote about cognitive semantics 
could be generalized to other approaches to semantics as well: „In our opinion, investigation 
of diachronic problems can, in turn, sharpen our view for fundamental semantic processes and 
should therefore be able to advance theorizing in cognitive linguistics. In this sense, historical 
semantics is an ideal testing ground for semantic models and theories …” (Blank/Koch 1999: 
1). This includes issues like the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics and methodo-
logical questions like minimalism. A case could be made for the view that theories of mean-
ing which contribute to our understanding of meaning change are not only wider in scope than 
  1those that do not, but that they are actually superior. It is therefore not surprising that recently 
even scholars in the field of formal semantics, a family of approaches to semantics originally 
not attracted to historical questions, have taken up matters of flexibility of meaning and mean-
ing change (cf. Eckardt 2006). Generally speaking, the history of historical semantics is 
highly instructive for a study of the ways in which the development of lexical semantics was 
advanced by competing theoretical conceptions of word meaning. So part of this history of 
theories can be told as a history of controversies. In this context it is worth noting that the 
discussion of a rapprochement between competing schools of semantics (cognitive semantics, 
pragmatic semantics, formal semantics) which has been initiated in the last few years has also 
partly taken place in the context of historical semantics (cf. Geeraerts 2002, Eckardt/von 
Heusinger/Schwarze 2003). From the point of view of empirical research in semantics, the 
history of word meanings in different languages is an invaluable repository of data for seman-
tic analysis and a source of inspiration for the treatment of questions like what is universal 
and what is culturally determined in meaning and change of meaning. 
 
2.   19
th century historical semasiology and the ideational theory of meaning 
 
Throughout the early development of historical semantics up to 1930 and in some cases much 
later (cf. Kronasser 1952) a view of meaning was taken for granted which has been called the 
ideational theory of meaning (cf. Alston 1964: 22-25). The classic statement of this theoretical 
view had been given by Locke as follows: „Words, in their primary or immediate significa-
tion, stand for nothing but the Ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly so-
ever, or carelesly [sic] those Ideas are collected from the Things, which they are supposed to 
represent“ (Locke 1689/1975: 405). By the time historical semantics emerged as a scientific 
enterprise in the second half of the 19
th century, this view was more or less the common-sense 
view of meaning. The fact that Frege and other contemporaries forcefully criticized this view 
on the grounds that ideas (“Vorstellungen”) were purely subjective, whereas meaning 
(“Sinn”) ought to be in some sense intersubjective, was either not noticed or not considered a 
serious problem (cf. Frege 1892/1969: 43f., Frege 1918/1966: 40ff.). (The problem of the 
subjectivity of ideas had of course been noticed by Locke.) One consequence of the ideational 
theory of meaning was that semantics was considered to be intimately related to matters of 
psychology, which was an unquestioned assumption for many linguists of the period. This 
attitude was, of course, also fostered by the fact that by the end of the 19
th century psychology 
had become a highly successful and prestigious field of research. So at least paying lip-service 
to the psychological relevance of historical work was also a matter of scientific rhetoric for 
many linguists – very much like today. In the first paragraph of his classic “Meaning and 
change of meaning” Stern explicitly stated: “The study of meanings, as of all psychic phe-
nomena, belongs to psychology” (Stern 1931: 1). It is therefore not surprising that the prob-
lem of lexical innovation was largely posed as a problem of individual psychology: How do 
new associations of ideas come about in the mind of an individual? To explain a change of 
meaning was to show how the mind could bridge the gap between a first cluster of ideas, the 
original meaning, and a second cluster, the new meaning. A case in point is the treatment of 
metaphor as a potentially innovative semantic technique. If one had to explain the first meta-
phorical use of the word lion to denote a brave man, the characteristics of the metaphor „must 
be sought in the speaker’s mental processes“ (Stern 1931: 301). The question to be answered 
was how would the idea of a brave man call up the idea of a lion and what could be the basis 
for the perception of a point of similarity between brave men and lions. An explanation of a 
meaning change could be considered successful from this point of view if the gap between the 
original and the new set of ideas could be shown to be small, if the gap could be reduced by 
the introduction of plausible intermediary stages, or if it could be bridged with reference to 
general laws of association (cf. Wundt 1904: 623). This methodological principle, which one 
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rarely made explicit as it was again firmly grounded in common-sense assumptions: The 
mind, like nature, does not take excessive leaps.  
From this point of view three stages of a change of meaning could be differentiated: In the 
first stage a word is used in a certain context, in which a certain (additional) idea becomes 
connected to the word. In a second, transitory stage the new idea is more intimately connected 
to the word through continuous use, so that the additional idea is called up in the mind even 
outside the original specific context. Finally, in the last stage, the new idea becomes the cen-
tral idea (“Hauptbedeutung”) which again admits new combinations of ideas. So what hap-
pens is that a secondary idea which is originally only associated to the word in certain specific 
contexts gains in strength and becomes the primary idea (cf. Stöcklein 1898:14f.). This view 
anticipates both the recent emphasis on the importance of certain “critical contexts” of inno-
vation (cf. Diewald 2002) and the cognitivist idea of shifts from peripheral uses to prototypi-
cal uses in meaning change and vice versa (cf. Geeraerts 1997). 
In a classic of historical semantics, the chapter on meaning change in his book “Principien der 
Sprachgeschichte”, Hermann Paul introduced a refinement of the ideational theory by distin-
guishing between established meaning (“usuelle Bedeutung”) and contextual meaning (“occa-
sionelle Bedeutung”), a distinction which plays a fundamental role in his theory of meaning 
change (Paul 1886: 66ff.). He defined the established meaning as the total content of ideas 
which is associated with the word for the members of a community of speakers, whereas the 
“occasional” meaning is defined as the content of ideas which the individual speaker associ-
ates with the utterance of a word and which he expects the hearer to associate with this utter-
ance as well. “Occasional” meaning is considered to be richer in content and narrower in 
range than conventional meaning, it is generally more specialized and monosemous, whereas 
conventional meaning is more general and may be polysemous. The latter explication shows 
that Paul did not have at his disposal the sharp distinction between sentence (or word) mean-
ing and utterer’s meaning which Grice introduced in his seminal article “Meaning” (Grice 
1957) and which was also inherent in Wittgenstein’s distinction between “bedeuten” and 
“meinen” (Wittgenstein 1953). Paul seems to have conceived of “occasional” and “usual” 
meaning as two different members of the same category. This category mistake, as one might 
see it today, does however not seem to have interfered with his theory of meaning change.  
The main tenet of this theory is that every meaning change starts from an innovative occa-
sional meaning. Such an innovative use may then be remembered by a speaker and thereby 
become a precedent for later uses. Through repeated application of the word in its occasional 
meaning the occasional meaning may become established in the community of speakers and 
thereby become “usual”. The next generation of speakers will then learn the word in its new 
conventional meaning. As an important element in his theory of meaning change Paul as-
sumed that the types of meaning change exactly correspond to the types of modification of 
occasional meaning. This assumption makes the essential theoretical link between synchronic 
meaning variation and change of meaning, which up to the present day connects pragmatics 
and historical semantics. Paul’s theory of meaning change also comprises other elements 
which are familiar to modern historical semanticist, e.g. a version of the concept of common 
knowledge as a basis for semantic innovation and the idea that knowledge is socially distrib-
uted, which leads to semantic specialization in different social groups. The importance of con-
text for the emergence of innovations was stressed by other authors of the semasiological tra-
dition as well, e.g. by Wegener (1885) and Sperber (1923), who explicitly differentiated be-
tween syntactic context and context of situation (“Situationszusammenhang”) (Sperber 
1923/1965: 25). The relevance of the syntactic context for the emergence of semantics inno-
vations, which has also recently been emphasized again (cf. Eckardt 2006), was stressed by 
Paul as well as by other contemporaries (e.g. Stöcklein 1898) and later representatives of se-
masiological research (e.g. Wellander 1923, Leumann 1927). Another aspect of meaning 
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in an early stage innovations are often restricted to a limited context from which they are then 
later generalized (cf. Stöcklein 1898: 13f., Sperber 1923/1965: 24, Oksaar 1958: 174ff.).    
One corollary of Paul’s and others’ view of meaning change was that meaning change leads to 
polysemy and that types of meaning change are reflected in types of polysemy, an idea that 
has recently been taken up again by various researchers (cf. Blank 1997, Fritz 1995, Geeraerts 
1997). The most insightful early treatment of polysemy was due to Michel Bréal, who, in his 
“Essai de Sémantique” (1897), introduced the term polysémie and devoted a chapter to this 
phenomenon. Whereas polysemy was often thought of as a defect of language, Bréal pointed 
out the functional advantages of polysemy: “Une nouvelle acception équivaut à un mot nou-
veau” (Bréal 1897/1924: 146).  
Outside the mainstream of traditional semasiology we find an important contribution to the 
theory of meaning change in a classic article by Antoine Meillet, “Comment les mots chan-
gent de sens”, published in 1905 in “Année Sociologique” (Meillet 1905/1965). In this pro-
grammatic article, Meillet presented the outline of a sociolinguistic view of meaning change 
which consists in an integrated theory of innovation and diffusion. According to this theory, 
semantic changes arise mainly due to the fact that speech communities are heterogeneous and 
that they are organized into different social groups. Whereas society as a whole tends to resist 
linguistic innovation, small groups tend to encourage innovation, a tendency which can be 
explained by conditions favouring the creation and adoption of innovations within smaller 
groups.  Due to the high level of common ground in small groups, specialized uses of words 
come into being and are easily adopted by the members of the group. In addition, this ten-
dency is supported by the fact that group-specific uses contribute to the coherence of the 
group. As the same individual may belong to different groups, simultaneously or in succes-
sion, there is an exchange of linguistic material between such groups, i.e. borrowing. As soon 
as a word is removed from its original sphere of usage and is taken up by wider circles, the 
new users will generally lack the inside knowledge available to the original group of speakers 
and will use the word in a less specific sense. Therefore the moving of words from group lan-
guages to the common language and vice versa causes semantic change. In a rudimentary 
form Meillet’s picture contains all the ingredients of later languages-in-contact theories of 
innovation and diffusion. 
One of the main issues of late 19
th and early 20
th century historical semantics was the question 
of the regularity of meaning change. As the discovery of “sound laws” (e.g. Grimm’s law) 
was the paradigm of successful linguistic research in the second half of the 19
th century, one 
easily came to the conclusion that semantics should aim to find “semantic laws” on a par with 
sound laws. An important step in accounting for the variety of semantic innovation was to 
show how that innovation was guided. In remarkable unison the handbooks on historical se-
masiology which appeared from the 1870s onwards (Bréal 1897, Darmesteter 1887, Ny-
rop/Vogt 1903, Paul 1886, Whitney 1875) dealt with this question by giving a classification 
of types of semantic change. Seeking to impose order on the seeming chaos of semantic de-
velopments, they made use of categories well-known from classical logic and rhetoric: restric-
tion of meaning, expansion of meaning, metaphor, metonymy, euphemism, and irony. The 
productive idea embodied in these classifications was the application of a methodological 
principle which had been forcefully proclaimed by the so-called Neogrammarians (Paul and 
others), the principle that the observation of present-day linguistic facts should serve as the 
basis for the explanation of the linguistic past. Following this principle, general knowledge 
about contemporary forms and conditions of referring uses, metaphorical and euphemistic 
speech etc. could be brought to bear on the explanation of historical changes. Of these catego-
ries of meaning change the first two (expansion and restriction of meaning) were often criti-
cized as being non-explanatory, merely classificatory categories taken from logic, whereas a 
description of a semantic innovation as a case of metaphorical innovation was obviously ac-
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occurred was no law statement, and therefore assigning an innovation to one of these types 
was, strictly speaking, no causal explanation. The same can be said for certain other generali-
zations that were formulated in this tradition and were called “laws”, e.g. the generalization 
that semantically closely related expressions tend to show similar meaning changes (cf. Sper-
ber 1923: 67; Stern 1931: 185ff.). In many cases the observation of parallel developments, 
which is of course a methodically important step, amounts to no more than the documentation 
of data which call for explanation. (For further examples and discussion of the question of 
“semantic laws” cf. Fritz 1998: 870ff.) Generally speaking, explicit reflection on what could 
count as an explanation of meaning change was fairly rare in this period, and it was only 
much later that basic questions concerning the concept of explanation in historical semantics 
were raised (cf. Coseriu 1974, Keller 1990). 
To get an idea of the wealth and quality of work produced in this period one has to go beyond 
the handbooks and look at the large dictionaries (e.g. the “Oxford English Dictionary” and the 
“Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm”) and at dissertations and articles 
written in journals, which provide a vast repository of historical data and analyses. Because of 
the generally positivistic outlook of scholars of this period, their work was highly data-driven, 
so that much of this work could be termed corpus-linguistic avant la lettre. On account of their 
attention to empirical detail, there are hardly any questions of meaning change known to us 
today that were not raised in one way or the other by scholars of this period. Unfortunately, 
much of this work is not known to present-day researchers, due partly to its inaccessibility, 
partly to language barriers. Overviews of semasiological research can be found in Jaberg 
(1901), Kronasser (1952), Ullmann (1957), Nerlich (1992), and Busse (2005). 
 
3.  Diachronic structural semantics 
 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, structuralist methods, which had been particularly success-
ful in phonology, began to become applied also to the field of semantics. Essentially, struc-
tural semantics is not a theory of meaning at all but rather a methodology for semantic analy-
sis. The basic idea that semantic analysis of a linguistic item should not be restricted to indi-
vidual words but should also take into consideration its neighbours, i.e. words with a similar 
meaning, and its opponents, i.e. words with antonymous meaning, had been well-known to 
late 19
th century linguists before the advent of structuralism (e.g. Paul 1895). It is interesting 
to see that in describing parts of the vocabulary where the systematic character of groups of 
expressions is fairly obvious, pre-structuralist and non-structuralist authors often displayed a 
quasi-structuralist approach. This is true, for example, of descriptions of the history of kinship 
terms or forms of address. 
In a more programmatic and theoretically explicit way this basic structuralist idea had been 
spelt out by Ferdinand de Saussure in his “Cours de linguistique générale” (1916). In Part 2, 
Chapter IV, § 2 of this groundbreaking book, which was compiled and edited by his pupils 
after his death, de Saussure discussed the difference between the meaning of a word and its 
“value” (“valeur”). He started out from the traditional definition of meaning as the idea con-
ventionally connected to the sound pattern of an expression and then went on to argue that 
this definition captures only one aspect of meaning, which has to be complemented with a 
second aspect, the “value”, i.e. the position which the respective word occupies in a system of 
lexical items. To illustrate this point he compared the meaning/value of the French word mou-
ton and the English word sheep. The two words, so his argument goes, may have the same 
meaning, i.e. they evoke the same idea of a certain kind of animal, but they do not have the 
same value, as there is in English a second word in opposition to sheep, namely mutton, which 
is not the case with French mouton. Apart from the fact that this description could be im-
proved upon, this theory obviously shows a certain tension between the two aspects that de-
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question remained open in which way meaning as idea and meaning as value contribute to the 
overall meaning of an expression. This theoretical problem did however not interfere with the 
application of the basic methodological principle.  
Starting from de Saussure’s fundamental assumptions and applying his general methodologi-
cal principles to the field of semantics, Jost Trier and some of his contemporaries (e.g. Weis-
gerber 1927) criticized the atomist views of traditional semasiology, as they saw it, and de-
veloped a type of structuralist semantics which in its early form was called the theory of con-
ceptual fields („Begriffsfelder“, Trier 1931), sometimes also called lexical fields (“Wort-
felder”) or semantic fields (“Bedeutungsfelder”). The basic tenets of this theory have been 
described by Ullmann (1957), Geckeler (1971), Gloning (2002) and others. Therefore I shall 
only point out those facets of the theory that are particulary interesting from the point of view 
of theories of meaning change. As mentioned before, words were no longer considered as 
isolated units but as elements of a lexical system. Their value was defined by their position in 
a system of lexical oppositions and could be described in terms of a network of semantic rela-
tions. Trier himself used the concepts of hyponymy (“Oberbegriff”) and antonymy 
(“Gegensinn”), however, due to his informal style of presentation he did not attempt to make 
explicit these or other types of sense relations (cf. Lyons 1963), nor did he attempt the kind of 
componential analysis that later structuralist authors used (e.g. Bech 1951). Change of mean-
ing, in Trier’s view, consisted in the change of the structure of a lexical system from one syn-
chronic stage of a language to the next. Within the framework of this theory the task of his-
torical semantics could no longer be the description and explanation of the historical fate of 
individual words (“Einzelwortschicksale”) but rather the comparison of the structures of suc-
cessive synchronic semantic fields along the time axis. Trier used his methods to analyze 
stages in the history of expressions of intellectual appraisal in German from Old High German 
to Middle High German, i.e. adjectives corresponding in meaning approximately to Latin 
words like sapiens and prudens or English words like wise, intelligent, clever, cunning etc. as 
well as the respective substantives. Starting by assuming a given conceptual field and then 
differentially analyzing the expressions allocated to this field, he used an onomasiological 
approach on a large corpus of medieval texts. His most famous analysis concerned the sub-
field of (intellectual) competence, where, according to Trier, in 12th century German there 
existed the opposition of kunst ‘qualification acquired through noble upbringing or higher 
education’ vs. list ‘technical skill learned by apprenticeship’, an opposition that was later to 
be replaced by the opposition of kunst vs. wizzen, ‘ability’ vs. ‘knowledge’, which no longer 
embodied courtly and social aspects of intellectual qualities. Trier’s pupils and followers ap-
plied this method to later historical developments in the intellectual field and to other fields 
like perception verbs (Seiffert 1968), adjectives of quantification and dimensionality (Stan-
forth 1967), the synonyms of warten ‘to look out for’, ‘to wait for’ (Durrell 1972) or expres-
sions denoting sounds (Lötscher 1973).  
Whereas Trier’s approach concentrated on the paradigmatic dimension, i.e. the dimension of 
items replaceable for each other in a certain position in the linear sequence, other authors 
dealt with the syntagmatic dimension, i.e. the co-occurrence of words in sentences. Again, 
this topic had also been dealt with by pre-structuralist authors like Sperber who, in his classic 
booklet (Sperber 1923) analyzed the collocations (“Konsoziationen”) of various expressions. 
A well-known early structuralist paper on this topic is Porzig (1934), where the co-occurrence 
of words like blond and hair or to fell and trees is described. Historical changes in this dimen-
sion could also be considered part of the change of meaning of a given expression. However, 
authors of this period did not do much to clarify in what sense co-occurrence relations could 
be considered to be an aspect of the meaning of a word. This was only later achieved in the 
development of distributional semantics (cf. Firth 1957), an approach which has recently 
gained renewed attraction due to new techniques of corpus analysis, which make it possible to 
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to quantitative data (cf. Heringer 1999).  
Critics of Trier found fault with various aspects of his theories and methods. One point of 
criticism was clearly formulated by Ullmann: “His hypothesis that fields are always com-
pletely covered by word-areas like mosaics, and divide up the whole universe into an organi-
cally articulated whole, remains unsubstantiated, and actually runs counter to what we know 
about the vagueness of the sense and the fluidity of its contours” (Ullmann 1957: 158). This 
objection was also empirically validated by Oksaar’s comprehensive study of the history of 
German adverbs signaling speed, plötzlich ‘suddenly’, schnell ‘rapidly’ and others (Oksaar 
1958), which was inspired by Stern’s pre-structuralist analysis of English adverbs like imme-
diately (Stern 1931: 185ff.). A different kind of criticism concerned the lack of precision and 
explicitness of Trier’s semantic descriptions, a critique which lead to later versions of struc-
tural semantics using distinctive semantic features of various kinds. These versions, which 
were theoretically more ambitious and descriptively more precise, were developed and ap-
plied to historical material by scholars like Gunnar Bech and Eugenio Coseriu. Bech (1951) 
used a system of semantic features to characterize the meaning of lexical items belonging to a 
closely-patterned domain of vocabulary, namely the modal verbs of German (e.g. müssen, 
können, dürfen, mögen). In this classic paper he analyzed various lexical oppositions within 
the field of modals, and from these oppositions he extracted semantic features in three dimen-
sions (necessity vs. possibility, intrasubjective vs. extrasubjective modal factor, causality vs. 
autonomy), describing the meaning of each expression as a cluster of three features. As the 
oppositions change over time, the clusters associated with each individual item also change in 
characteristic patterns. A similar method was applied to the history of English modals by Tel-
lier (1962). When the semantics of modals and their history became a focus of semantic re-
search some twenty years ago (cf. Fritz 1997a, Diewald 1999, Traugott/Dasher 2002: 105ff.), 
these classical studies also received new interest.  
From the point of view of the theory of meaning, the semantic features used by Bech involve 
problems concerning their status and their formal properties, which they share with other con-
cepts of semantic features and which have been discussed by Lewis (1972: 169ff.), Heringer 
(1974: 88ff.) and others. It is not clear whether the expressions used to indicate the features 
were considered to be simply descriptive natural language predicates or part of a special 
metalinguistic vocabulary or if they were even meant to indicate a universal store of concepts. 
And, of course, the feature language had no syntax, which considerably restricted its descrip-
tive power.  
In a well-known paper, Coseriu (1964) expounded an updated version of structuralist dia-
chronic semantics. He showed how distinctive features could be extracted from paradigmatic 
lexical oppositions and how semantic change could be described in terms of changes of sys-
tems of oppositions. A favourite example of his was the development of Latin kinship terms 
in the course of the emergence of the Romance languages. All Romance languages gave up 
the distinction between „paternal line“ and „maternal line“ which characterized Latin kinship 
terminology. Whereas Latin had a four-element system for referring to uncles and aunts 
(patruus ‘paternal uncle’, avunculus ‘maternal uncle’, amita ‘paternal aunt’, matertera ‘ma-
ternal aunt’), the French counterpart is a two-element system (oncle / tante). The emerging 
Romance system is consequently characterized by the loss of the opposition ‘paternal’ vs. 
‘maternal’, a development which can be structurally described as the disappearance of the 
corresponding feature. Coseriu’s approach has been quite influential, especially in the field of 
Romance studies, but it has recently also come under criticism from Romance scholars and 
others (cf. Blank 1996, Taylor 1999).  
In structuralist research the description of language-specific lexical system changes as ex-
plored by Coseriu was often followed by a so-called internal explanation, e. g. by reference to 
homonymic clashes, or by a so-called external explanation, e. g. by reference to social 
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1966 on „The linguistic reflex of social change“). 
Criticism of structuralist semantics, especially feature semantics (Semantic Markerese, as 
Lewis called it), has come from various quarters, from truth-functional theorists, as mentioned 
before, and more recently from cognitivist and “meaning-as-use” theorists. Among the prop-
erties and assumptions of structural semantics which make it less adequate for historical se-
mantics than other present-day semantic theories, the following have frequently been men-
tioned:  
(i) Structuralist theory is strong on the aspects of the language system (“la langue”), but weak 
on the properties of speech (“la parole”), i.e. the use of language. As semantic innovation and 
diffusion are matters of language use, large portions of historical semantics cannot be ade-
quately treated within the framework of structural semantics. 
(ii) As structuralist semantics is focussed on the analysis of language-internal relationships, it 
has to draw a strict boundary between semantic and encyclopaedic knowledge, which makes 
it difficult to explain how innovative patterns of use like metaphor or metonymy work. 
(iii) Due to its minimalist methodology, structuralist semantics is not well equipped to analyze 
cases of polysemy, which play a central role in semantic development.  
(iv) Semantic features tend to be viewed in terms of necessary and collectively sufficient con-
ditions for the correct use of an expression. This view precludes a satisfactory analysis of 
cases of family resemblances and prototype effects of the kind that Wittgenstein and cognitiv-
ists influenced by Wittgenstein (e.g. Rosch/Mervis 1975, Lakoff 1987) described. It therefore 
makes it difficult to account for minimal shifts of meaning and semantic changes involving 
the shifting of prototypical uses within the polysemic structure of a word. 
To conclude: As structural semantics is essentially a theory of the structure of vocabulary and 
not of the use of vocabulary, it does not provide a theoretical framework for a number of im-
portant problems in historical semantics. Generally speaking, it fails to give an integrative 
view of linguistic activity in its various contexts, i.e. the relationship between language struc-
ture and social practices as part of historical forms of life. It does not provide the theoretical 
means for taking into account either the knowledge used in semantic innovation or the com-
municative function of innovations, two aspects which, according to more recent views, play 
a fundamental role in the explanation of semantic innovation. A final limitation lies in the 
methodological requirement that lexical oppositions should only be sought within homogene-
ous systems, whereas semantic change is often due to the heterogeneity of linguistic traditions 
within one linguistic community. As a consequence of these limitations, structural semantics 
has not contributed much to recent developments in historical semantics. It is, however, inter-
esting to see that the structuralist heritage has been absorbed by most later approaches, e.g. 
the principle that one should take into account the network of semantic relations between 
lexical units, both paradigmatic and syntagmatic (cf. Lehrer 1985, Heringer 1999).  
  
4. Cognitive  semantics 
 
The rise of cognitive semantics in the 1980s was partly driven by a dissatisfaction with struc-
turalist and “formalist” theories of meaning and language in general (e.g. structural semantics, 
truth-functional semantics, Chomskyan linguistics). Many of the basic ideas of the various 
strands of cognitive semantics were developed and presented rhetorically, sometimes polemi-
cally, in opposition to these approaches (cf. Lakoff 1987, Taylor 1999) The following points 
summarize some of the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, of which most are in direct con-
tradiction to fundamental assumptions of structural semantics as mentioned in the preceding 
section: 
(i)  Meanings are mental entities (e.g. concepts, conceptualizations or categories). 
(ii)  Aspects of meaning are to be described with reference to cognitive processing. 
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  different types of links, prototype structures, family resemblance structures etc.) 
(iv)  Categories are often blurred at the edges.  
(v)  Many categories can not be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. 
(vi)  Linguistic meaning is essentially encyclopaedic. There may be central and peripheral 
  aspects of lexical knowledge, but there is no dividing line between encyclopaedic 
  and lexical knowledge.  
(vii)  Metaphorical and metonymical models play a fundamental role for meaning. 
(viii)  Cognitive Grammar does not draw a distinction in principle between “sentence 
  meaning” and “utterance meaning” (cf. Taylor 1999: 20). 
Whereas structural semantics and its successors did not have much to say about phenomena 
like metaphor and polysemy, it was exactly these topics that played a central role in the de-
velopment of cognitive semantics and which triggered the popularity of cognitive linguistics 
in the in the 1980s and beyond (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980, Brugmann/Lakoff 1988, Taylor 
2002). And it is also these topics which made historical semantics interesting for cognitive 
semantics and vice versa. Of course, the differences between broadly structuralist views and 
cognitive semantics are linked to fundamental differences in the goals pursued by these direc-
tions of research, especially the cognitive linguists’ goal of using the study of linguistic mean-
ing as a window on cognitive processes of conceptualization.  
In certain respects, the cognitive view of semantics harks back to traditional semasiology, e.g. 
in its close relation to psychology, in its concept of meaning, its rejection of a clear distinction 
between sentence meaning (or word meaning) and utterance meaning, its pronounced interest 
in topics like polysemy and metaphor, and in its interest in semantic regularity and the “laws 
of thought”. This connection has been acknowledged by several scholars (e.g. Lakoff 1987: 
18, Geeraerts 1988:1997), but, as Geeraerts hastened to add, cognitive semantics is not to be 
seen as a simple re-enactment of the approach of the older school (Geeraerts 1997: 27). What 
puts present-day cognitive semantics in a different position seems to be not only the fact that 
there have been considerable advances in linguistic theory and semantic theory in particular, 
but also the availability of more sophisticated theories of categorization and conceptualization 
like the theory of prototypes and family resemblances developed by Rosch and others (e.g. 
Rosch/Mervis 1975), advanced psychological theories of metaphor (cf. Gibbs 1994), the the-
ory of conceptual blending (Fauconnier/Turner 2002), and the conception of figure-ground 
organization from Gestalt psychology. Still, on account of the similarity in theoretical outlook 
it is not surprising that some of the objections to traditional “ideational” views (cf. section 2) 
have been raised also in relation to cognitive semantics. These objections include the problem 
of subjectivism (cf. Sinha 1999), the speculative character of the assumed conceptual struc-
tures and processes (cf. Taylor 2002: 64f.) and, even more fundamentally, the question of 
circularity of (some) cognitivist explanations in (historical) semantics, which was raised by 
Lyons and others (e.g. Lyons 1977: 113; 1991: 13) and has recently been brought up again by 
Keller (1998: 72). These objections are mostly not considered worth discussing at all by the 
practitioners of cognitive semantics or tend to be waved aside (e.g. Langacker 1988: 90), but 
there are exceptions, for instance John R. Taylor, who devotes a chapter of his book on cogni-
tive grammar to these questions (cf. Taylor 2002: Ch. 4, cf. also Taylor 1999: 38). No doubt, 
these foundational questions should be given further reflection. There are also observations 
from historical semantics which could shed doubt on the advisability of the direct identifica-
tion of meaning with concepts. In many cases of meaning change it is doubtful that one 
should describe the relevant developments as changes of concept. A case in point is the well-
known development of the German words for head, Kopf and Haupt. (Similar developments  
in the Romance languages are documented in Blank 1998.) In medieval German we have the 
word kopf ‚drinking vessel, cup‘, which is etymologically related to Vulgar Latin cuppa, the 
source of English cup. In the 12
th century soldiers started to use the word kopf as a sarcastic 
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th century kopf became 
widely used and the use loses its sarcastic note. During this period the use of kopf competes 
with the traditional Germanic word haupt ‚head‘, and the use of kopf for referring to drinking 
vessels becomes obsolete. From the 16
th century onward, kopf is the everyday word for refer-
ring to the head, whereas haupt continues to be used only in formal language. This kind of 
semantic history is quite straightforward. If, however, we talk about these changes of use in 
terms of changes of concepts, we get quite counterintuitive results. One would have to say: 
From the 12
th century onward the concept of cup was extended to cover heads as well, and 
later on this concept lost the aspect of drinking vessel. This is obviously not what happened. 
As far as we know there were no fundamental changes either in the concept of cup or in the 
concept of head from the 12
th to the 16
th century. Therefore, changes of meaning should not 
generally be equated with changes of concepts or categories. 
As for its contribution to historical semantics, it is particulary through research on metaphor, 
metonymy and polysemy in general that cognitive semantics has inspired historical work both 
theoretically and in its methodological outlook. Concerning relevant work in the field to date, 
we can discern two kinds of contributions. There is on the one hand programmatic work using 
synchronic data or well-known historical data for the purpose of demonstrating the feasibility 
and fruitfulness of a cognitive approach to problems of historical semantics (e.g. Sweetser 
1990, Langacker 1999) and on the other hand genuinely data-driven empirical work, for in-
stance by Geeraerts (e.g. Geeraerts 1997) or the Romance scholars Blank and Koch,  
both from an onomasiological and a semasiological perspective. 
As an example of empirical work with both theoretical and methodical interest for historical 
research on polysemy I should like to mention Geeraerts’ analysis of the historical develop-
ment of clusters of uses within the framework of a diachronic prototype semantics. In his case 
study of the development of the Dutch verb vergrijpen from the 16
th to the 19
th century (Geer-
aerts 1983, 1997: 47-62) he shows how peripheral nuances of meaning arise around central, 
prototypical meanings (‚to make a mistake‘, ‚to do something wrong‘) and form new clusters 
with „subprototypical“ centres. In some cases, new meanings seem to arise through the joint 
influence of several existing ones (Geeraerts 1997: 60). Sometimes a certain use of a word 
seems to crop up now and then, with long intervals, but it does not become an established use. 
Such “transient meanings” also show aspects of the semantic potential of an expression which 
may not be continuously exploited by the speakers. This interesting feature of the semantic 
history of words has been generally neglected in the literature. Especially structuralist seman-
ticists did not have anything to say about this phenomenon. The picture that emerges is not 
one of individual major changes but of a continuing process of small innovations, of rear-
rangement and reinterpretation of internal relations in the polysemous meaning structure of 
the word. The analysis highlights a very frequent type of “soft” development which contrasts 
with abrupt changes consisting in the introduction of one well-defined new (metaphorical or 
metonymical) use.  
In addition to his empirical analyses, Geeraerts also focuses on theoretical matters of the ex-
planation of change of meaning. He insists that one should not confuse mechanisms and 
causes of semantic change. The patterns of use he calls mechanisms (e.g. metaphor, meton-
ymy, euphemisms etc.) „indicate the possible paths of change“ (p. 103), whereas a cause „in-
dicates why one of these possibilities is realized“ by an individual speaker (p. 103). He further 
emphasizes that functional aspects should play a major role in the explanation of semantic 
changes. In his view, principles like the principle of expressivity or the principle of efficiency 
are causes in this sense or, more strictly speaking, ‚functional motivations‘“(p. 120). As for 
these principles, expressivity concerns the communicative needs of the speakers, an aspect of 
meaning change that has always been emphasizes in functional approaches (cf. section 7), 
whereas principles of efficiency include, amongst others, prototypicality as “a cognitive effi-
ciency principle”. So, the upshot seems to be that, strictly speaking, there are no causes at all 
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ers‘ practice of finding new uses and accepting them. But they do not cause linguistic action, 
they guide linguistic action. At the level of the individual’s activities there are no causes of 
semantic innovation. 
Somewhat outside the mainstream of cognitive semantics we find a group of Romance schol-
ars (Blank, Koch, and their collaborators) who have contributed extensively to historical se-
mantics from a basically cognitivist viewpoint. Starting with the discussion of the theory of 
prototypes (Koch 1996) and going on to studies of metonymy (Blank 1997, 1999b, Koch 
1999, 2001) and cognitive onomasiology (Blank 2003, Koch 2000; cf. also Gronde-
laers/Geeraerts 2003), these researchers have combined theoretical analysis with fruitful em-
pirical research. A “summa” of this research programme is the comprehensive book on the 
principles of lexical meaning change by the late Andreas Blank (Blank 1997), in which he 
discusses basic questions of meaning change, drawing on a wealth of data from the Romance 
languages. He critically reviews the results of traditional and structuralist historical semantics 
as presented in the works of Ullmann, especially Ullmann (1964), and develops a non-
mainstream cognitive-semantic framework. What links him to the cognitivist movement is his 
view that meanings have Gestalt properties and that forms of meaning change are essentially 
based on conceptual associations of various types (Blank 1997: 137ff.). However, he criticizes 
the identification of meaning and concept and suggests a semiological model which reintro-
duces the differentiation of encyclopedic knowledge (“Weltwissen”) and language-specific 
semantic knowledge (“sememisches Wissen”) including knowledge of the polysemous mean-
ing structure of words (p. 102). Central to this framework is his presentation of types of mean-
ing change in terms of techniques (or devices) of semantic innovation. He aims to show that 
what was often subsumed under “causes of semantic change” has to be differentiated into 
techniques of innovation on the one hand (e.g. linguistic devices like metaphor and meton-
ymy), including their cognitive prerequisites, and motives for innovation and for the uptake 
and lexicalization of innovations on the other (cf. also Blank 1999a). Such motives include 
the speakers’ practice of observing communicative principles, a view which he shares with 
pragmatic theories of meaning change. On the cognitive plain, he characterizes metaphor and 
metonymy by the speakers’ use of similarity associations and contiguity associations respec-
tively, explicating the traditional contiguity relation in terms of concepts, frames and scenar-
ios (cf. also Blank 1999b, Peirsman/Geeraerts 2006). 
In various case studies Blank shows the interaction of culture-specific knowledge and general 
cognitive principles as resources for semantic innovation. A case in point is his analysis of the 
development of the French word bureau from ‘coarse brown wool fabric used to cover tables 
in counting houses’ to ‘office’ in a chain of metonymical and metaphorical links (Blank 1997, 
248; for metonymic chains cf. also Nerlich/Clarke 2001). It is, among other points, Blank’s 
insistence on the importance of socio-cultural knowledge within historical traditions of dis-
course which shows a shift of emphasis in his view of semantic change as compared to the 
mainstream cognitivist focus on universal cognitive principles. This provides a fruitful tension 
between the historical and the universalist perspectives and “avoids prematurely treating the 
findings at the historical level as universal, especially making the characteristics of certain 
individual languages into the standard of an analysis of linguistic universals” (Koch 2003: 
45).  
 
5. Theories  of  grammaticalization 
 
The term grammaticalization is generally used to refer to a type of historical change by which 
lexical items come to serve grammatical functions. In this process, the lexical items are said to 
become “semantically bleached” and they undergo syntactic restrictions and “phonetic ero-
sion”. A classic example is the development of the Old English main verb willan ‘to want’, 
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of development is the change from post-classical Latin facere habeo ‘I have to do’, ‘I will do’ 
to French (je) ferai, where the original Latin verb habere with the meaning ‘to have’ is gram-
maticalized into the future tense suffix –ai. This type of development was well known to 19
th 
century linguists, who already used metaphors like fading or bleaching (German Verblassen ) 
to describe the result of relevant semantic developments. In a much-quoted article, published 
in 1912, the French linguist Antoine Meillet introduced the term grammaticalisation to refer 
to this type of development and emphasized the “weakening” of both meaning and phonetic 
form (“l’affaiblissement du sens et l’affaiblissement de la forme”; Meillet 1912/1965: 139) as 
characteristic of this process. He also put forward the view that innovations like the post-
classical Latin facere habeo (as opposed to classical faciam) had a particular expressive value 
at the time when they were first used, but lost this value in the course of the further process of 
grammaticalization. From the 1980s onwards there has been a “veritable flood of … scholar-
ship on grammaticalization“ (Campbell/Janda 2001), including detailed analyses of individual 
phenomena like the ones mentioned before (e.g. Aijmer 1985) and comprehensive overviews 
of cross-linguistic research (Bybee/Perkins/Pagliuca 1994, Heine/Kuteva 2002) as well as 
introductory texts (e.g. Hopper/Traugott 2003). 
From the point of view of historical semantics, the interest of grammaticalization research lies 
mainly in its contribution to the description of paths of semantic change from a given 
“source”, e.g. a lexical unit denoting movement (to go), to a “target” expression which is used 
to signal future events (to be going to), some of which seem to have a remarkable breadth of 
cross-linguistic distribution. It is the richness of data from both genetically related and unre-
lated languages that makes grammaticalization research such a useful heuristic instrument for 
questions of regularity in semantic change. On the strength of these cross-linguistic data some 
quite strong claims have been made concerning the regularity of relevant types of semantic 
change, including the assumption that there exist quasi-universal “cognitive and  communica-
tive patterns underlying the use of language” (Bybee/Perkins/Pagliuca 1994: 15) and “the 
hypothesis that semantic development is predictable” (Bybee/Perkins/Pagliuca 1994: 18). 
Other researchers have been somewhat more guarded in their claims, restricting themselves to 
the assertion that there are interesting cross-linguistic similarities in the recruitment of certain 
lexical sources for given grammatical targets. A further hypothesis, which has received a great 
deal of attention in the last few years, is the hypothesis of unidirectionality, i.e. the non-
reversibility of the direction of change from less to more grammaticalized (cf. Campbell 
2001: 124ff., Hopper/Traugott 2003: Ch. 5). 
As for their background of semantic theory, scholars working on grammaticalization are fre-
quently not very explicit as to the kind of semantic theory they embrace. From the fact that 
some authors at times use the expressions “meaning” and “concept” more or less inter-
changeably one might infer that they are of a basically cognitivist persuasion (e.g. 
Heine/Kuteva 2002), whereas others rely on pragmatic (Gricean or Neo-Gricean) concepts 
(e.g. Traugott/König 1991). Concerning its descriptive methodology, research on grammati-
calization, especially in the case of cross-linguistic surveys, often tends to settle for relatively 
coarse-grained semantic descriptions, which usually serve the purposes of this work quite 
well, but which can sometimes also give a wrong picture of the actual types of semantic mi-
cro-development. This preference for a semantic macro-perspective is not really surprising, as 
the focus of much of this work is the origin and development of grammatical forms.    
From a theoretical point of view, some of the semantic concepts used in grammaticalization 
research are both interesting and, in some respects, problematic. This is true, for instance, of 
the term bleaching mentioned above, which comes in handy as a metaphorical cover-all for 
various types of semantic development. One such type of change is the loss of expressive 
meaning of metaphors in the course of routinization. Another type, which is often mentioned 
in grammaticalization research, is explained as “loss of concrete and literal meanings” and the 
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Brinton/Traugott 2005: 100). This explanation presupposes that we know what an “abstract 
and general meaning” is, but a clarification of this concept, which again goes back at least to 
Meillet, is generally not attempted. As for the use of the bleaching metaphor, it seems that in 
many cases this may be quite harmless, but if used as a stand-in for more precise semantic 
descriptions, it might give an inaccurate view of the developments in question. For instance, 
calling the development of an additional epistemic use of the modal may (as in He may have 
known, as opposed to You may go now) a case of bleaching is downright misleading, as the 
epistemic use is in no way more “abstract” or the like and the non-epistemical sense normally 
remains being used alongside the epistemic one. The use of the term bleaching can be particu-
larly problematic in those cases where the diagnosis of bleaching is based on a direct com-
parison of the source and the target use of an expression, leaving out several intermediate 
steps of development. As some authors have noticed, there is a tendency in grammaticaliza-
tion research to reduce continuous, chainlike processes to two uses of forms, viz., source and 
target uses (cf. Heine/Kuteva 2002: 6), without paying attention to the complex development 
of systems of related uses of the expressions in question. In such cases the diagnosis of 
bleaching turns out to be an artefact of the descriptive methodology. These observations lead 
to the conclusion that the description of source-target-relations should be generally supple-
mented with detailed studies of the individual steps of semantic change in terms of the chang-
ing structure of clusters of uses. The importance of this methodological precept has also been 
acknowledged by scholars from the grammaticalization movement (Heine 2003: 83). 
A closely connected conceptual question concerns the relation of “lexical meaning” to 
“grammatical meaning”. Traditionally, the background for the classification of the meaning of 
an expression as a case of grammatical meaning is often the following: If what can be ex-
pressed by a certain expression (e.g. declaring one’s future intentions by using a sentence with 
a modal verb) can also be expressed by a grammatical morpheme in the same or another lan-
guage (e.g. by a future tense morpheme in Latin), then this expression has (a) grammatical 
meaning. This is somewhat doubtful reasoning, as one could easily turn the argument around 
and say that if a certain meaning can be expressed by non-grammatical means, then this is a 
case of non-grammatical meaning, which could be said for the expression of wishes or the 
expression of admonitions, which in Latin can be expressed by lexical means as well as by the 
use of the subjunctive mood (“coniunctivus optativus” and “coniunctivus adhortativus”). So, 
from the fact that Latin uses the subjunctive to express wishes it does not follow that ‘express-
ing wishes’ is a case of grammatical meaning. So there is a certain vagueness to the concept 
of grammatical meaning, which is sometimes acknowledged by the assertion that there is “no 
clear distinction between lexical and grammatical meaning” (cf. Taylor/Cuyckens/Dirven 
2003: 1) or that there is a gradient from lexical to grammatical meaning. 
A final point worth mentioning is the question of how the individual steps of a grammaticali-
zation chain should be described and explained. Some researchers, mainly from the cognitiv-
ist camp, assumed that these individual steps were generally cases of metaphorical transfer, 
e.g. from the spatial to the temporal domain (from going to as a motion verb to going to as a 
future tense marker) or from the social to the cognitive domain in the case of the development 
of epistemic uses of modals from non-epistemic uses (e.g. the may of permission to the may 
of possibility, cf. Sweetser 1990: 58ff.). However, recent more data-oriented research has 
shown that in many cases there is no evidence in the data of metaphorical transfer at all, but 
rather of the use of contextual and general knowledge for small metonymic steps (cf. Brin-
ton/Traugott 2005: 28, Fritz 1991, 1997b, Traugott/Dasher 2002). Generally speaking, the 
upshot of these observations on meaning change in grammaticalization is that there is no spe-
cial type of semantic change characteristic of grammaticalization, but rather that it is gener-
ally well-known types of semantic change which contribute to the stepwise development typi-
cal of grammaticalization processes: “Grammaticalization is only one subclass of change 
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grammaticalization research programme in its various forms to the study of meaning change 
consists mainly in the fact that it initiated substantial cross-linguistic research into possible 
paths of semantic change and the issue of unidirectionality, which has considerable heuristic 
value for historical semantics.  
 
6.  Meaning as use and pragmatic semantics 
 
The family of theoretical approaches dealt with in this section goes back mainly to works by 
Wittgenstein and some of his followers on the one hand (e.g. Strawson 1964, Alston 1964, 
Heringer 1978) and to Grice and his followers on the other. As is well known, Grice was very 
doubtful as to the usefulness of the precept that one should be careful to identify meaning and 
use (Grice 1989: 4), so it seems that there is at least a certain reading of Wittgenstein (and 
Grice), where the Wittgensteinian and the Gricean views on meaning are not easily recon-
ciled. This has to do with their divergent views on the foundational role of rules and estab-
lished practices on the one side and intentions on the other, which lead to differing perspec-
tives on the analysis of the relation between Bedeutung (Gebrauch) and Meinen in Wittgen-
stein’s picture of meaning and sentence-meaning (or word-meaning) and utterer’s meaning in 
Grice’s theory. It is not possible to review here the relevant discussion (e.g. Black 1975, cf. 
Gloning 1996: 110ff.). Suffice it to say that it seems possible to bridge the differences of these 
views by emphasizing the instrumental aspect of Wittgenstein’s view of language and taking 
into account the fact that Grice in his analysis of “timeless meaning” also accepted not only 
“established meaning”, but also “conventional meaning” with its element of normativity 
(“correct and incorrect use”, Grice 1989: 124ff.). Such an integration of views (cf. Meggle 
1987, Keller 1998) provides a useful starting point for an empirical theory of meaning and 
meaning change. For this kind of theory it comes quite naturally to see the historical character 
of meaning as an essential aspect of meaning and to view uses of linguistic expressions as 
emerging solutions to communicative and cognitive tasks (cf. Strecker 1987). It is further-
more part of the Gricean heritage to assume that what is meant is often underspecified by 
what is said. 
It is remarkable that both Wittgenstein and Grice at least hinted at the fact that there is an his-
torical dimension to the use of language, Wittgenstein in § 23 of his “Philosophical Investiga-
tions”, where he emphasized that new types of language games continually arise and old ones 
disappear (cf. also “On certainty, § 65), and Grice in a passage in “Logic and conversation”, 
where he mentioned that “it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a con-
versational implicature to become conventionalized” (Grice 1989: 39). It is of course true, 
however, that neither Wittgenstein nor Grice developed a theory of meaning change or of 
polysemy which could be simply applied to empirical work. This has to do with the context in 
which their theoretical views were developed. Wittgenstein’s insistence on the importance of 
scrutinizing the multiple uses of words, for example, is not due to a special interest in 
polysemy as a linguistic phenomenon, but rather as a therapeutical move in conceptual analy-
sis. Therefore, in order to implement the relevant ideas of these philosophers in an empirical 
theory of meaning change and the methodology of historical semantics one has to spell out in 
detail many aspects of meaning and meaning change which are only hinted at by these au-
thors.  
Such details of theory and methodology include: (i) an explication of the concept of “use” (cf. 
Heringer 1978, Heringer 1999: 10ff.), including the analysis of types and aspects of contexts 
of use (cf. Fritz 2005: 17ff.) and an explication of the relationship between “uses” and collo-
cations of expressions (cf. Heringer 1999: 32ff.), (ii) methods for the description of the struc-
tures of polysemies (cf. Fritz 1995), (iii) the classification of types of semantic innovations, 
their functions and resources (cf. Fritz 2006,: 36ff., Keller/Kirschbaum 2003: Ch. 4), includ-
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semanticists, (iv) corpus-based methods for the description of semantic innovation and mean-
ing change (cf. Fritz 1991, 1997b, Heringer 1999).   
The instrumental view of meaning provides powerful instruments, guiding principles and as-
sumptions for historical semantics. Such instruments comprise (i) Grice’s theory of implica-
tures as an instrument for analysing meaning innovation, including the role of “conversational 
maxims” and the structure of reasonings as hermeneutical devices, (that inferences play an 
important role in meaning change) (ii) the concept of “mutual knowledge” (as a methodologi-
cal fiction) developed as an extension of Gricean ideas (Schiffer 1972), which is related to 
such linguistic concepts as “common ground”, (iii) Lewis’s theory of convention (Lewis 
1969), which shows the reasoning involved in a process of conventionalization, a useful in-
strument for the analysis of the dynamics of conventionalization, (iv) the contextual view of 
meaning rules embodied in the concept of language games, (v) the assumption that language 
games and meaning rules are embedded in historical forms of life, (vi) the assumption that in 
many cases the uses of a word have a family resemblance structure (cf. PI § 66f.), the assump-
tion that among the uses of certain expressions there are more central and more peripheral 
cases (cf. Wittgenstein 1970: 190), the assumption that the meaning of natural-language ex-
pressions is (usually) open-textured (cf. PI §§ 68-71, 84, 99), the assumption that there is no 
division in principle between knowledge of meaning and knowledge of fact ( PI §§ 79, 242, 
“On certainty” § 63).  
Whereas cognitive theories of meaning change tend to concentrate on the processes of con-
ceptualisation which make an individual’s innovation cognitively plausible, a functional and 
dialogical view also takes into account the fact that innovations are often sparked off und fa-
cilitated by the dynamics of local communicative context, that speakers aim at “recipient de-
sign” in their (innovative) talk and “work” to ensure uptake, that it is socially and culturally 
distributed knowledge which, in many cases, is both a condition and a consequence of seman-
tic innovation, and that the reasons for which an innovation is attractive in the first place (e.g. 
functional benefits like expressive value or cognitive value) also facilitate its acceptance by 
other speakers and thereby advance its diffusion. Generally speaking, a basically functional 
and dialogic approach to meaning innovation and meaning change favours an integrative per-
spective on the resources and the functions of semantic innovations and it also helps to focus 
on problems which are neglected by other approaches, e.g. the processes of routinization and 
conventionalization and the paths of diffusion of new uses (cf. Fritz 2005: 49ff.). It also 
shows an affinity to an explanation of meaning change in terms of an invisible hand theory 
(cf. Keller 1990), in which action-theoretical concepts like intentions and maxims of action 
loom large. 
Examples of the kinds of problems discussed in these frameworks and of the empirical work 
available include: the historical development of systems of metaphorical and metonymical 
links (Fritz 1995 on the history of the extreme polysemy of German scharf), the complex de-
velopments in the semantics of modal verbs (Traugott 1989, Traugott/Dasher 2002, Fritz 
1991, 1997a, b, Gloning 1997), developments in the history of speech act verbs 
(Traugott/Dasher 2002, Hundsnurscher 2003, Fritz 2005: Ch. 16), the development of evalua-
tive uses of adjectives (Keller/Kirschbaum 2003), the development of various types of uses of 
conjunctions (causal, conditional, concessive)(Traugott/König 1991), the development of dis-
course markers and modal particles (e.g. Jucker 1997, Günthner 2003, Hansen 2005, Fritz 
2005: Ch. 18), the functional explanation of grammaticalization in terms of unintentional re-
sults of expressive discourse techniques (Detges/Waltereit 2002), the description and analysis 
of invisible-hand processes in the conventionalisation and diffusion of lexical items (Kel-
ler/Kirschbaum 2003: Ch. 4), the functional explanation of developments in the structure of 
vocabulary (Gloning 2003). 
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of the evolution of causal connectives from earlier purely temporal connectives (e.g. English 
since, German weil) given by various authors (e.g. Traugott/König 1991). This type of devel-
opment was well known to pre-structuralist linguists and also described in ways broadly simi-
lar to modern Griceans (e.g. Paul 1895: 72 on German weil). However, the modern analysis 
achieves a higher degree of explicitness concerning the aspects of communication involved. A 
connective like since (Old English siþþan) originally meant ‘after’, however in certain con-
texts it seems to have been used to contextually suggest (in addition) a causal relation. Mak-
ing use of the shared assumption that an event following another might be caused by the prior 
event and applying principles of relevance and informativity, the speaker could implicate or 
invite the inference that there was a causal relation between the two events. This could be 
described as a case of “pragmatic strengthening” (cf. König/Traugott 1988, Traugott 1989). 
When such a conversational implicature became conventionalized, a new variant of use arose, 
leading to polysemy, as in the case of Modern English since (temporal and causal uses). The 
theory of “invited inference” and “pragmatic strengthening” has also been applied to other 
types of expressions, e.g. speech act verbs (Traugott/Dasher 2002) and the development of 
epistemic uses of modal verbs (Traugott 1989, Traugott/Dasher 2002: Ch. 3). As Traugott and 
Dasher noted, the Gricean analysis covers many cases of what was traditionally subsumed 
under metonymy, which is not surprising, as metonymy uses shared knowledge concerning 
inferential (“associative”) connections within a given domain. It is also worth noting that the 
Gricean viewpoint in some cases suggests a non-metaphorical inferential analysis where ear-
lier cognitivist work preferred an explanation in terms of metaphorical extension (cf. Sweetser 
1990: Ch. 3). This is the case for a much-discussed topic, viz. the rise of epistemic meaning in 
modals, where detailed corpus analysis seems to speak against an analysis in terms of meta-
phor (cf. Traugott 1989 for modals in English, Fritz 1991, 1997a: 94ff. for modals in Ger-
man).  
Comparing the approaches presented in this section with the cognitivist approaches mentioned 
in the last section, one finds deep-going theoretical divergences and also differences in per-
spective, but also remarkable convergences. A fairly fundamental theoretical difference con-
sist in the fact that cognitivists embrace a representationalist view of meaning (words stand 
for concepts), whereas functionalists tend to favour an instrumentalist view. Related to this we 
find another divergence: at least from a purist Wittgensteinian position, the definition of 
meaning as conceptualization would seem to be an elementary category mistake. As for dif-
ferences in perspective, the basic difference seems to be: Whereas cognitivists will use the 
analysis of semantic innovation mainly as a window on cognitive processes, a functionalists 
will be primarily interested in the linguistic (pragmatic, rhetorical) practices of meaning inno-
vation and their function in the strategic negotiation of speaker-hearer interaction. They will 
therefore view types of knowledge, connections between knowledge frames etc. as re-
sources used for meaning innovation, usually showing a somewhat agnostic attitude towards 
the various types of “backstage cognition” (Fauconnier 1999: 96) assumed in cognitive ap-
proaches. On the other hand, cognitivists and functionalists join hands in assuming polysemy 
as a fundamental fact of linguistic practice and cognitive processes, family-resemblance and 
prototype structures of polysemous meaning, the central role of metaphor and metonymy in 
meaning innovation, and the indiscernibility of semantic and encyclopedic knowledge. As for 
the tendencies of convergence, which have been growing in the last few years, I shall add a 
few remarks in the concluding section of this article.  
I should like to conclude this section by drawing attention to a problem which has, to my 
knowledge, so far not been seriously tackled by historical semanticists, but which is certainly 
also a problem for historical semantics and not just for philosophers and historians of science. 
This is the much-debated question of the relationship between theory change, change of 
meaning, and change of concepts. One of the central problems discussed in this debate, the 
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work on this topic, Kuukkanen states that “incommensurability may be taken as the practical 
difficulty of achieving translation and reaching comprehension in a situation where the same 
expressions imply radically different assumptions” (Kuukkanen 2006: 10). As Dascal has 
shown in various writings, there is at the moment an impasse in the philosophy and history of 
science (cf. Dascal 2000), which has to do with a lack of attention to the actual communica-
tive processes (often) involved in the growth of scientific knowledge. At least partly, the 
questions if and how communication between opposing parties in a foundational controversy 
is possible and if in the course of such debates there is a change of meaning of relevant ex-
pressions are empirical questions that cannot be answered in the philosopher’s armchair, but 
only by empirical studies, to which historical semantics could certainly contribute. In the case 
of the famous Phlogiston controversy one could, for instance, show how critical expressions 
like air (Luft) or combustion (Verbrennung) are used by the opposing parties and in which 
way they are connected to the use of other expressions like phlogiston or oxygen and to de-
scriptions of the experimental praxis involved in the development of this theoretical field. A 
case in point is the debate between the German chemist Gren and his opponents in the “Jour-
nal der Physik”, which ended by Gren’s conversion to (a version of) Lavoisier’s theory of 
oxidation. To my mind, the type of semantic theory that would be most adequate to this ana-
lytical task is a version of pragmatic semantics. 
 
7.  Formal semantics and pragmatics 
 
Trying to write the present section some twenty years ago, one would have probably come to 
the conclusion that there was nothing to write about. Formal semantics was concerned with 
rules of inference, matters of compositionality and the proper treatment of quantifiers and 
logical connectives, but rarely with lexical semantics and certainly not with matters relating to 
the change of meaning. Now this is in fact not quite true. As far back as Frege’s writings from 
the 1890s onwards we find an awareness that ordinary language is flexible in a way that influ-
ences the reliability of formal reasoning or at least implies aspects that might be relevant to 
logical consequence. Frege noticed that there are individual differences in the use of expres-
sions (e.g. proper names with a different sense (“Sinn”) for different Persons, Frege 
1892/1969: 42), that the denotation of certain expressions is determined by context, that we 
sometimes make certain presuppositions in using referring expressions, that natural language 
words are sometimes ambiguous, and that some natural language connectives (like if – then, 
but or although) have properties which their truth-functional counterparts do not have. In ad-
dition to their truth-functional properties the latter connectives serve to give extra hints 
(“Winke”) as to the kind of connection involved or to produce certain “lighting effects” 
(“Beleuchtung”) on a complex proposition, as Frege metaphorically put it (Frege 1923/1966: 
84). As Frege also noted, the use of the conditional connective often suggests an additional 
causal connection, which is however not part of the truth-functional meaning of this connec-
tive. In Gricean terms it is a conversational implicature, but conversational implicatures may 
in time become conventional, as can be shown for many connectives in different languages.   
So what we find in Frege’s writings is a certain amount of attention to problems relating to 
semantic and pragmatic aspects of natural language, which are in turn related to questions of 
historical semantics, i.e. ambiguity, context-dependence, individual differences of use, and 
implicatures. But, of course, Frege mentioned these things mainly to get them out of the way 
of his project of producing a well-behaved language for scientific uses. Therefore, for him and 
for many later logicians and formal semanticists the standard solution to these problems was 
to suggest that one should “purify ordinary language in various ways” (Montague 1974: 84). 
Another strategy was to delegate these aspects of natural language use to an additional prag-
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implicatures. 
In recent times, this picture of how formal semantics relates to matters of semantic variation 
and semantic change has obviously changed. Generally speaking, there has been a develop-
ment towards the integration of dynamic, pragmatic and lexical aspects of meaning into for-
mal semantic or formal pragmatic theories which are relevant to questions of meaning change. 
Although attempts to capture the dynamics of language change with formal theories have re-
ceived sceptical comments in the past (cf. Eckardt 2006: 28), recent developments in formal 
semantics seem to give hope for a fruitful rapprochement. If the use of formal theories in his-
torical semantics should in future contribute to an increase in explicitness, precision and sys-
tematicity of semantic analyses, this would certainly be a good thing. Of course, using a for-
mal apparatus does not guarantee rigour in semantics, as Geach ably showed in his criticism 
of Carnap (Geach 1972).  
There are various recent approaches which could be related to questions of meaning change or 
which have actually tackled such questions, of which I shall mention three. A first family of 
such approaches are dynamic theories which could be subsumed under the heading of update 
semantics/pragmatics. The common denominator of such approaches is 
the view that the utterance of a certain expression changes the context, i.e. the common be-
liefs of the interlocutors, in a specific way (cf. Stalnaker 1978: 2002), from which one can go 
on to assume that the meaning of an expression could be modelled in terms of its context 
change potential. In order to model this dynamic aspect of discourse and meaning one has to 
assume some kind of score-keeping procedure, e.g. “commitment store operations” as in 
Hamblin’s Formal Dialectic (Hamblin 1970: 253, ff.) or Lewis’s “rules specifying the kine-
matics of conversational score” (Lewis 1979: 346). This basic idea has been spelt out in dif-
ferent versions, e.g. in Kamp’s discourse representation theory (cf. Kamp/Reyle 1993) and 
Heim’s file change semantics (cf. Heim 1983). By using these and similar methods, it is pos-
sible to produce semantic models of information growth which can, among other things, deal 
with the phenomenon of an incremental updating of common ground.  
This type of approach could be useful for research in historical semantics in several respects. 
It could, for instance, give us a clearer picture of the processes involved in the emergence of 
“common ground” in general (e.g. the concept of mutual knowledge specified in Lewis 1969: 
56 or Schiffer 1972) and conventions in particular (cf. Lewis 1969). As new uses of words 
often emerge against the background of common assumptions, the building-up of common 
ground is an important aspect of semantic innovation. By using this kind of apparatus one 
could, for example, model a very frequent type of semantic change which consists in the 
emergence of new evaluative uses of expressions originally used descriptively. Take a noun 
like (young) servant, which serves to refer to persons of a certain social status: If in a given 
speaker community the assumption becomes common knowledge that such persons frequently 
show criminal tendencies, this expression can be used to accuse someone of being a criminal, 
which in time may become a conventional use of the word. This kind of development is fre-
quently found in various languages (cf. Middle High German buobe and schalk, English 
knave and varlet, French gars). A similar process permits descriptive adjectives to be used in 
evaluative function, which is also a very frequent type of meaning change.  
A second trend in recent formal semantics and pragmatics is the interest in “systematic 
polysemy”, especially in the various uses of words based on metonymic relations, e.g. uses of  
expressions denoting institutions like the university to refer to the buildings housing this insti-
tution or to the members of this institution. Recent analyses of this kind of polysemy include 
Nunberg (1995), Pustejowsky (1995), Copestake/Briscoe (1996), Blutner (1998) and Pe-
ters/Kilgarriff (2000). In historical semantics, awareness of this type of polysemy and its regu-
lar character goes back to its very beginnings in the 19
th century, so historical semantics has 
much to offer in terms of historical data for this kind of phenomenon. On the other hand his-
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day corpora. Recent work has shown that metonymic sense extension can be considered a 
productive – or at least semi-productive – process, which is, however, subject to certain re-
strictions. One can assume that certain groups of words have the same extension potential, 
which is however not always exhaustively used. It would be very useful to systematically sur-
vey the ways in which this extension potential was used in different historical periods and to 
analyze the factors blocking the productivity of this process, of which some may turn out to 
be language specific or culture specific. 
A third approach, which has fortunately gone beyond the programmatic stage and has pro-
duced actual empirical work in the field of historical semantics, is the formal reconstruction of 
the process of semantic reanalysis (cf. Eckardt 2006). Meaning change under reanalysis is 
particularly frequent in instances of grammaticalization. Cases in point are the development of 
the English going-to future marker or the development of the German quantifier-like expres-
sion lauter in the sense of ‘only’ or ‘many’ from the earlier adjective lauter ‘pure’. Eckardt’s 
analyses proceed from the idea that meaning change under reanalysis is essentially a change 
of the contribution of the respective expressions to the compositional structure of typical sen-
tences. In order to analyze these changes in compositional structure, Eckardt uses techniques 
of truth-functional semantics, “which is still the semantic paradigm that addresses semantic 
composition in the most explicit manner” (Eckardt 2006: 235), and combines them with 
methods of conceptual semantics and pragmatics. This is an ingenious approach which con-
siderably stretches the boundaries of what would traditionally be considered truth-functional 
semantics. One of the hallmarks of this approach is a high degree of explicitness and preci-
sion, which proves extremely useful in the analysis of rather subtle and complicated processes 
of change. In addition to reaching very interesting empirical results, Eckardt succeeds in dem-
onstrating “that the notions and formalisms in formal semantics can be fruitfully set to work 
in the investigation of diachronic developments” (Eckardt 2006: 234) and that “the investiga-
tion of language change can offer substantial input to synchronic semantic research” (Eckardt 
2006: 188). 
     
8.   Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, historical semantics is a research area where fundamental problems of se-
mantics tend to surface and which can be seen as a testing ground for theories of meaning and 
for methodologies of semantic description. A case in point is structural semantics with all its 
strengths and weaknesses, which brought into focus meaning relations between different ex-
pressions in a lexical paradigm, but which had no answers to problems like the nature of 
metaphor, polysemy and evolutionary processes in general, and which therefore fell into dis-
favour in the last twenty years. Historical semantics as a field of empirical research always 
flourished in times when it was a focus of theoretical debate. This is true of the 1890s, of the 
1930s, and of the last 25 years. So, with cognitive semantics and pragmatic semantics compet-
ing and with formal semantics joining in the recent debate, signs are good for a dynamic de-
velopment of this field of research. 
It is obvious that the direction of interest and the emphasis on certain aspects of meaning 
change is largely determined by the concept of meaning which individual authors and schools 
of thought embrace. It is, however, striking to see that in many cases empirical work with 
corpus data forced researchers to transcend the limitations of scope of their respective theo-
retical frameworks and take into account aspects of meaning and meaning change which were 
not really covered by their semantic theory. This is true of most of the schools of historical 
semantics discussed in this article, and it seems to demonstrate the healthy effect of data-
driven work, which potentially also motivates advances in theoretical reflection.   
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eas of theory. Certain ways of making the demarcation would be completely unplausible for 
an empirical theory of meaning change from the start, e.g. viewing semantics in terms of 
truth-conditions and pragmatics as taking charge of the rest. But also the standard demarca-
tion in terms of conventional and conversational aspects of meaning does not fare much bet-
ter. As most of the dynamic aspects of meaning change, e.g. innovation, selection, and diffu-
sion, are generally considered to fall into the field of pragmatics, historical semantics, as it is 
practiced today, would have to be seen as a proper subfield of historical pragmatics. The pub-
lication policy of a journal like “Historical Pragmatics” bears witness to this view. If, how-
ever, semantics is considered to be concerned only with established meanings to the exclusion 
of contextually determined utterance meaning, we get a somewhat restrictive view of histori-
cal semantics, according to which it should concentrate on contrasting the established mean-
ings of certain expressions at time 1 with those at time 2. This is basically the structuralist 
picture, which leaves out just about everything that is interesting about change of meaning. In 
view of the fact that routinization and conventionalization are gradual processes one could 
argue that there is a gradual transition from pragmatic to semantic phenomena. This argument, 
apart from showing that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a semantics-pragmatics 
interface, would make historical semantics a subject which hovers uneasily between two theo-
retical fields. So what seems to be needed as a basis for an empirical theory of meaning 
change is a genuinely dynamic theory of meaning and understanding which encompasses both 
the rule-based and the inference-based aspects of meaning. From this it does of course not 
follow that there is no categorial difference between speaker meaning (Meinen) and 
word/sentence meaning (Bedeutung), as some cognitive semanticists seem to assume. 
Looking to the future development of historical semantics there seem to be at least three areas 
where progress in theory and methodology could be achieved: (i) the detailed comparison of 
competing theories of meaning as to their contribution to a theory of meaning change, and the 
clarification of points of convergence of these theories, (ii) further clarification of basic con-
cepts like “explanation of meaning change”, “uses of words”, “metonymy”, and descriptive 
categories like “bleaching”, “subjectification” etc., (iii) further development of descriptive 
methodology, especially corpus-methodology, for historical semantics. Of these points I 
should like to briefly take up the first and the last. 
As mentioned in sections 6 and 7 there is a tendency within cognitive linguistics to extend its 
scope to a “cognitive-functional” view (cf. Tomasello 1998). Within historical semantics this 
tendency is apparent in publications by Blank and Koch as well as in recent work by Geer-
aerts and others (e.g. Nerlich/Clarke 2001, Traugott/Dasher 2002), where we find attempts at 
integration of cognitivist and pragmatic views. Geeraerts explicitly stated that “such a process 
of convergence – if it will take place at all – could find a focal point in a pragmatic, usage-
based perspective to lexical semantics” (Geeraerts 2002: 38f.). This is not a trivial project, as 
there are still fundamental divergences in theoretical outlook between these approaches, e.g. 
the big divide between representionalist and instrumentalist (functionalist) theories of mean-
ing and the complex corollaries of this divide concerning the status of conceptualization and 
linguistic meaning etc. It would be a remarkable development indeed, if the methodological 
needs of historical semantics should pave the way to bridging this theoretical divide. A similar 
thing could be said for the divide between cognitivist and realist theories of meaning, the lat-
ter of which are the prevailing view in formal semantics. In actual empirical work researchers 
often practice a certain degree of theoretical and methodological opportunism, which furthers 
fruitful empirical work while leaving basic theoretical questions untouched. Maybe this is a 
useful application of Austin’s principle of letting “sleeping dogmatists lie” (Austin 1970: 75). 
From a more theoretically-minded perspective, however, one would like to see these founda-
tional questions clarified. 
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the methodological preference of many scholars in theoretical semantics as a means for pre-
serving unity of meaning, is as a rule not favoured by researchers doing empirical work in 
historical semantics. The precept that one should not multiply senses (beyond necessity), ad-
vocated both by structuralists (e.g. Bech 1951) and, more recently, by Griceans (cf. Grice 
1989: 47-50), is basically a useful principle in that it forces researchers to differentiate be-
tween what a word means and what is conversationally implicated in a certain context. But it 
also fosters the tendency to explain as implicatures what must be seen as established uses of 
expressions. This tendency is counterproductive in historical semantics, as in many cases the 
interesting question is exactly how to differentiate between conversational innovations and 
well-established uses of an expression. In this situation, corpus data often give very good in-
dications as to which uses (or senses) of an expression can be considered firmly established at 
a given point in time and which are transient or peripheral. Furthermore, from what research 
in historical semantics has found in the last few years, both within cognitive and pragmatic 
frameworks, semantic minimalism seems to give a fundamentally wrong picture of what is 
going on in change of meaning in many cases. Arguably, the most fruitful approach to the 
description of meaning change from the semasiological perspective consists in treating se-
mantic evolution as the development through time of sets of uses and their respective internal 
structures (cf. Geeraerts 1997: 23ff., Fritz 2006: 14ff.). 
As for corpus methods, corpus-based analysis has tradionally played an important role in his-
torical semantics, because researchers cannot rely on their own linguistic competence in his-
torical studies. Recent developments in corpus technology and corpus methods have strength-
ened this methodological preference and widened its scope of application. Modern corpus 
linguistics has, however, not only provided new methods of data generation and data interpre-
tation, but has also inspired reflection on theoretical questions like the relationship between 
collocations of given expressions and their meaning (cf. Heringer 1999). Large corpora can 
also help to make visible phenomena which are not easily seen in smaller collections of texts, 
e.g. gradual changes in the contexts of use of given expressions within a diachronic corpus, 
which can be interpreted as reflexes of gradual changes of meaning. More sophisticated 
analyses of gradual change of meaning certainly belong to the desiderata for future empirical 
research. In semantics, the availability of large amounts of data does, however, not render 
unnecessary methodological procedures like the contextual interpretation of instances of the 
use of a word or the inference from distributional facts to semantic descriptions. This is true a 
fortiori of historical semantics. Such procedures are widely used, but are theoretically not well 
understood, so here we have another area where further studies are necessary. Generally 
speaking, the important recent developments in historical semantics have opened new vistas 
for empirical research, and in so doing have also shown the necessity for further clarification 
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